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La evidencia empírica presentada en este documento arroja dudas sobre el “hecho”
ampliamente aceptado que los planes de estabilización basados en el tipo de cambio son
inicialmente expansivos. Aún cuando estos programas estuvieron asociados con booms de
producto, no se encontró evidencia de booms causados por los programas de estabilización.
Más bien, shocks externos positivos parecen haber causado tanto los booms de producto
como los planes de estabilización.
Abstract
The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts doubts on the by now widely accepted
"fact" that the exchange rate based stabilization programs are expansionary. Even though
these programs were associated with output booms, no evidence of booms caused by the
stabilization programs is found. Rather, positive external shocks seem to have caused both the
output booms and the stabilization programs.
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1. Introduction
Not long ago, the conventional macroeconomic wisdom taught that price stabilization
programs cause an initial slowdown in the rate of growth of output, due to rigidities in
nominal contracts (Fischer, 1988; Taylor 1980, among others). In recent years, this traditional
view has been challenged. A large number of case studies and several comparative studies
concluded that stabilizing from high inflation using the exchange rate as the nominal anchor is
initially expansionary rather than contractionary (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992; Végh, 1992;
Reinhart and Végh, 1994; and Reinhart and Végh, 1995; among others). According to this
literature, exchange rate based stabilization (ERBS) programs cause a business cycle with an
initial "boom" and a recession later. In this view, only the programs that use the quantity of
money as the nominal anchor exhibit recessions from the very beginning. Easterly (1996)
went further in the revision of the stylized facts associated with the stabilization programs. He
presents evidence in support of the proposition that stabilization programs are always
expansionary, not only in their initial phase.
The empirical proposition that price stabilization programs have systematic real effects -
including domestic currency real appreciation, current account deficits and output cycles -
stimulated the theoretical research. As a result, there is a growing theoretical literature aimed
at identifying the mechanisms behind these “stylized facts” (Calvo, 1986; Helpman and
Razin, 1987; Calvo and Végh, 1993; Roldós 1995a and b; Uribe, 1995; among others).
The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the empirical proposition that ERBS
programs have been expansionary. Using data from Latin American countries, we found no
evidence of output booms caused by the ERBS programs. Rather, external shocks explain the
output booms that have been ascribed to the stabilization programs in previous studies.
Besides, we present evidence that the ERBS programs were to some extent an endogenous
response to the external shocks. Other things equal, Latin American governments seem to
have been more willing to launch ERBS programs when the external conditions were2
relatively more favorable, and hence the coincidence of the booms and the stabilization
programs.
Most of the empirical evidence that has been presented to support the proposition that the
ERBS programs have been initially expansionary refers to Latin America. Therefore, it seems
appropriate to focus on the same region to revise this hypothesis. Besides, there is no other
region in the world that has experienced two and three digit annual rates of inflation for more
than three decades. The stabilization policies have been at the top of the policy agenda in
Latin America for all this period, and several comprehensive stabilization programs have been
implemented. Hence, the region exhibits the policy variability that is necessary to identify
statistical regularities. At the same time, even though Latin American countries are not
homogeneous, they have been to a large extent submitted to similar external shocks. This
helps to control for other sources of variation when evaluating the effects of the stabilization
policies.
The identification of the episodes that should be classified as stabilization programs is not
always clear. Indeed, deciding when a program is actually in place, when it starts and when it
finishes involves some degree of discretion. Easterly (1996) has recently emphasized this
point, arguing that the recession-now-versus recession-later hypothesis fails to hold, if the
stabilization programs are identified using objective criterions based on inflation performance.
He proposes an objective criterion for the selection of the stabilization episodes: inflation of
over forty percent for two years or more followed by a period of two years or more of inflation
below forty percent. Using this criterion, Easterly identifies 28 stabilization episodes in the
1960-1994 period, all over the world. He then shows that no recessions were associated with
these episodes, the pattern being the same for exchange rate based and money based
stabilization programs.
Even though the idea of using an objective criterion to date the stabilization programs is
indeed appealing, Easterly’s procedure and the results obtained are highly controversial.
Above all, there seems to be a contradiction in defining the programs  according to their3
results (the inflation rate) in order to analyze their results. There are episodes in which
inflation went down mainly because of favorable external shocks, without the government
having implemented a specific stabilization policy. There are also major stabilization attempts
that failed to reduce inflation. This methodology biases the selection against the unsuccessful
programs. Hence, it is not surprising that the list of stabilization programs that emerges from
Easterly's algorithm is controversial. For instance, only one stabilization program is found in
Argentina in the period 1960-1994. Also, among the southern cone tablitas, only the
Uruguayan one appears in this list. So, while the point raised by Easterly cannot be dismissed,
the proposed solution looks worse than the problem it was designed to solve. The specific
dating of the stabilization programs is indeed controversial, but the identification of the main
stabilization attempts looks much less so, at least in Latin America in the last three decades.
Hence, in this study, we stick to the “conventional” list of stabilization programs (Reinhart
and Végh, 1994).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a probit model for the
ERBS programs. The analysis of the effects of the programs on GDP growth is presented in
section 3. Section 4 ends the paper with some concluding remarks.
2. Explaining the ERBS programs
Given the high rates of inflation that many countries in Latin America exhibited from the
sixties to the nineties, it is not surprising that several major stabilization programs were
implemented in the region in this period. What is less obvious is that regional shocks
conditioned the opportunities chosen to launch the programs. The ERBS programs in Latin
America were roughly implemented simultaneously in several countries. A bunch of plans
were implemented in the mid sixties, the tablitas in the late seventies, the "heterodox" plans in
the mid eighties and then the plans of the late eighties and first half of the nineties. Not only
were the programs launched together, they were also abandoned at the same time. Apart from
contagion effects, this suggests that stabilizations were endogenous responses to a set of4
determinants common to various countries in the region. The analysis that follows makes this
point more formally.
A probit model was estimated using panel data for the Latin American countries that
implemented ERBS programs in the last three decades. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable that takes value one, if an ERBS program started in the country in that year, and 0
otherwise. The domestic explanatory variables are the lagged logarithm of inflation (LPI), the
lagged logarithm of the international reserves to GDP ratio (LIR), and a dummy for
parliamentary elections (PARELE), lagged two periods. The foreign explanatory variables are
the percent increase in US stock prices (represented by Standards and Poors 500 Index,
SP500) and the rate of growth of GDP in industrial countries (IGDPG)(see the appendix for
the description of the data). The results are reported in table 1.
Table 1: Probit model. Dependent variable: E1i,t
Variables Estimate Error t-statistic P-value
LPIi,t-1 0.615 0.166 3.704  ** [.000]
LIRi,t-2 0.551 0.269 2.045  * [.041]
PARELEi,t-2 0.945 0.417 2.267  * [.023]
SP500t -SP500t-1 2.559 1.198 2.137  * [.033]
IGDPGt 40.874 16.777 2.436  * [.015]
CONSTANT 3.366 4.193 0.803 [.422]
Number of observations 160
Number of positive observations 12
Pseudo R-Squared (Cragg and Uhler 1970)    a/ 0.388
Pseudo R-Squared (McFadden 1974)           a/ 0.328
Notes: Period of estimation: 1963 to 1994. Countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico and Uruguay. a/ See Maddala (1983). Sources: see the
appendix.
The coefficients are statistically significant at five percent at least, and exhibit the “right”
signs. As to the domestic determinants, ERBS are more likely to be launched when inflation5
in the previous year was larger, when foreign reserves were higher, and in the second year
after parliamentary elections. The first two results are natural, robust and self explanatory. The
third seems to indicate that politicians are more willing to launch an ERBS during the early
phase of the Congress period. Both the rate of growth of GDP in industrial countries and the
return on US stocks, as measured by the rate of growth of Standard & Poors 500 Index, are
positively associated with the beginning of ERBS programs in Latin America. The qualitative
results are robust to changes in the sample. Several interest rates in the US were also tested,
but were either non significant or non robust to small changes in the sample.
These results seem to confirm that, other things equal, policymakers were more willing to
launch ERBS programs when the international environment was relatively more favorable. It
does not mean, of course, that only when facing good external conditions did Latin American
governments start a stabilization program, for several domestic variables proved important in
the decision. Our result is indeed consistent with the launching of some stabilization programs
under unfavorable external conditions, as was the case of the Argentinian Austral plan in
1985. The external conditions were very negative for Argentina at that time, but an
inflationary process that was running out of control left the government with few options
(Canavese and Di Tella 1988).
3. The stabilization programs and the business cycle
The purpose of this section is to revise the empirical evidence on the business cycle associated
to the ERBS programs in the light of the new “fact” raised in the previous section, namely that
the ERBS programs were mostly launched under favorable external conditions.
Reinhart and Végh (1994) submit the stabilization-programs-business-cycle hypothesis to
statistical scrutiny, using data from Latin America during the last three decades (1964-1993).
They perform regression analysis with panel data on the seven Latin American countries that
implemented stabilization programs in the period. The rate of growth of real GDP is the6
dependent variable and several dummies are designed to capture different stages of the
stabilization programs. One such regression is reported in column 1 in table 2. E1, E2 and E3
take value one in the first, second and third year of an ERBS program, respectively. E4 takes
value one in the fourth and following years of an ERBS program. ME (for “money early”) is
equal to one in the first year and ML (for “money late”) is equal to 1 in the last year of a
money-based stabilization program. 
1
We detected some extreme values in our dataset that significantly affected the results.
According to the IMF, Brazilian real GDP grew at a rate of 23 per cent during 1965, the
second year of the 1964 ERBS program. In order to avoid that the results were driven by this
extreme observation, the Brazilian 1964 program was excluded from the sample. Hence, the
analysis that follows is based on
the five money based and eleven of the twelve exchange rate based stabilization programs
implemented in Latin America since 1964 (see table A1 in the appendix for the list of
programs).
The Reinhart-Végh-like regression reproduces very well the stylized business cycle that has
been ascribed to the stabilization programs. In particular, an early boom and a recession later
is found in the ERBS programs, while money based stabilization programs are associated with
recessions from the very beginning.
                    
1 These are not exactly the Reinhart-Végh dummies. They included just two
dummies for the ERBS programs, one for the first (“exchange early”) and
one for the last year (“exchange late”). Adding the other two renders the
estimation more robust, and specially increases the ability of the
regression to capture the output booms, for some of them were actually
visible during the second calendar year after the initiation of the ERBS
programs.7
However, the probit model showed that the initiation of the ERBS programs was associated
to the occurrence of particular circumstances that are likely to have an independent
influence on growth. Hence, there is a potential selection bias in regression 1 of table 2,
produced by the statistical association between the program dummies and the explanatory
variables in our probit model.















E4 t -0.031   **
(-2.059)
-0.032   **
(-2.138)
ME t -0.068   ***
(-3.058)






SP500 t-1 ---- 0.039   *
(1.640)
IGDPG t-1 ---- 0.330   * 
(1.730)
GDPG t-1 ---- 0.255   ***
(3.698)
Adj. R2 0.033 0.105
Notes: t values in parentheses. One, two and three stars indicate
significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. Fixed Effects
estimations. Sources: see the Appendix.8
The second regression in table 2 controls for stock prices in the United States and GDP
growth in industrial countries, both lagged one period, and for lagged domestic GDP growth.
The first two regressors proved important in explaining the launching of ERBS programs, and
are hence potential sources of bias if omitted. The inclusion of lagged GDP growth in the
regression should improve the efficiency of the estimation.
The estimated coefficient associated to the second year of an ERBS program is now lower,
and not significantly different from zero (at a 10 percent of confidence). Notice that industrial
countries’ GDP growth, and the percent increase in the US stock prices, significantly
contributed to explain current GDP growth in Latin American countries. Apparently, at least
part of the output booms observed in the region at the beginning of the ERBS programs could
actually be ascribed to the external shocks.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we performed a sensitivity analysis along the
lines of Leamer (1985), and Levine and Renelt (1995). The sensitivity of the estimations of
the effects of the programs is analyzed running regressions that include the program dummies,
the lagged endogenous variable, and varying sets of controls. The control variables are
organized in two subsets. The first includes the growth of the Standard & Poor 500 stock
index (SP500), the Federal Reserve discount rate (DISC), the Federal Funds rate (FF), the
treasury bills rate (TB), the Prime rate (PR), and the rate of return on US government 3-years
bonds (GB). These variables are expected to capture external to the region conditions
influencing capital flows to Latin America (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1992 and 1993).
The second subset of controls includes industrial countries’ GDP growth (IGDPG), industrial
countries’ investment-GDP ratio (IINV), and the percent change in the terms of trade of each
country (TOT). We started estimating all the combinations of these two subsets, taking one
control variable from each subset lagged one period. Then, we estimated the same
combinations using the contemporaneous and lagged values of the controls (except for the
TOT where second lag was included,avoiding the contemporaneous value). Thus, we ran 36
different combinations for each estimation method (fixed and random effects).9
Table 3 summarizes the information from the regressions yielding the highest and lowest t-
value for the parameter of interest. “Base” refers to the regression without controls. The
Hausman test systematically rejected the hypothesis of the individual effects being correlated
to the regressors, so the random effects estimations should be consistent and more efficient
than the fixed effects estimations. Yet, both are reported since the test has low power in small
samples.
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis
A. Fixed effects
Variable Extremes Coeff Standard
Error
t Adj-R2 Controls
E1 High 0.010 0.016 0.630 0.125 TOTt-1 TOTt-2 SP500t SP500 t-1
Base 0.006 0.016 0.342 0.033
Low 0.004 0.015 0.250 0.146 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 FFt FFt-1
E2 High 0.034 0.016 2.092 0.132 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 SP500t SP500 t-1
Base 0.029 0.017 1.768 0.033
Low 0.023 0.016 1.462 0.146 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 FFt FFt-1
E3 High 0.008 0.018 0.482 0.163 IINVt-1 PRIMEt-1
Base 0.007 0.018 0.370 0.033
Low 0.000 0.018 0.012 0.146 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 FFt FFt-1
E4 High -0.037 0.015 -2.454 0.092 TOTt-1 SP500 t-1
Base -0.031 0.015 -2.039 0.033
Low -0.027 0.015 -1.846 0.163 IINVt-1 PRIMEt-1
ME High -0.053 0.021 -2.499 0.157 IINVt-1 GBt-1
Base -0.068 0.022 -3.045 0.033
Low -0.041 0.022 -1.816 0.130 SP500t SP500 t-1 IINVt IINVt-1
ML High 0.034 0.022 1.507 0.132 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 SP500t SP500 t-1
Base 0.020 0.023 0.874 0.033
Low 0.012 0.022 0.535 0.146 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 FFt FFt-110
Table 3 (cont.)
B. Random effects
Variable Extremes Coeff Standard
Error
t Adj-R2 Controls
E1 High 0.007 0.015   0.454   0.137 TOTt-1 TOTt-2 SP500t SP500 t-1
Base -0.000 0.016 -0.003 0.033 
Low -0.000 0.015   -0.008  0.172 TOTt-1 PRIMEt-1
E2 High 0.029 0.015   1.929   0.142 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 SP500t SP500 t-1
Base 0.023 0.016 1.415 0.033
Low 0.018 0.015   1.226   0.180 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 PRIMEt PRIMEt-1
E3 High -0.013 0.017   -0.788  0.137 TOTt-1 TOTt-2 SP500t SP500 t-1
Base -0.001 0.018 -0.040 0.033
Low -0.000 0.017   -0.001 0.153 IGDPGt-1 TBt-1
E4 High -0.040 0.014   -2.901 0.108 TOTt-1 SP500 t-1
Base -0.038 0.015 -2.529 0.033
Low -0.034 0.014   -2.444 0.142 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 SP500t SP500 t-1
ME High -0.051 0.021   -2.430 0.132 DISCt-1 IINVt-1
Base -0.068 0.022 -3.044 0.033
Low -0.039 0.021   -1.841 0.141 SP500t SP500 t-1 IINVt IINVt-1
ML High 0.035 0.021   1.637 0.142 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 SP500t SP500 t-1
Base 0.023 0.023 0.986 0.033
Low 0.013 0.021   0.611 0.155 IGDPGt IGDPGt-1 FFt FFt-1
Notes: See the appendix for the sources and the list of variables.
The E2 coefficient is positive in all the regressions, but it is non robust. Hence, even though
there seems to be larger than average rates of growth at the beginning of the ERBS programs,
it is not possible to say that these rates of growth are really larger than expected, given
previous growth and external shocks. The E4 coefficient is always negative, with a lowest t-
value of -1.846, corresponding to a P-value of 0.067. The negative ME coefficient is robust in
this set of regressions. In summary, recessions are generally more robust than booms in this
analysis. 
2
                    
2  We estimated a set of regressions with country-standardized series
to eliminate country wise heteroscedasticity. The results are
qualitatively the same. We prefer to present the estimations with the
original variables, because point estimates on the effects of the plans11
4. Concluding remarks
The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts serious doubts on the by now widely
accepted "fact" that ERBS programs are  expansionary. It was shown that previous
comparative studies lacked appropriate controls, and thus overestimated the positive effects of
the stabilization policies on output. No significant positive effects of the ERBS programs were
found when other variables that capture the external shocks were included, while the
recessions remained.
A related "fact", that has been largely neglected in the literature, is that, other things equal, the
launching of a ERBS program is more likely when the region faces favorable external
conditions. Some recent theoretical literature provides plausible explanations of this link
(Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Casella and Eichengreen, 1994; and Orphanides, 1996). Precisely
this "fact" explains the overestimation of the effects of the stabilization programs in previous
empirical studies. 
3
                                                                          
do not have a simple interpretation with standardized series. Other
results are available upon request.
3  It should be mentioned here that Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) have
already noticed that most ERBS programs were initiated under favorable
external conditions. Also Simonsen (1988) and Ortiz (1988) identified
external conditions that were favorable to Brazil when the Cruzado
program was launched. A similar point was made by Bruno and Piterman
(1988) and by Cukierman (1988) for the 1985 Israeli stabilization
program. However, somehow surprisingly, no further consequences for the
analysis of the "stylized facts" associated with the ERBS programs seem
to have been derived from this observation.12
At the very least, the analysis in this paper suggests that the evidence on the booms caused by
the stabilization programs should be carefully reassessed. Even if, after some more empirical
research, it is found that the ERBS programs can have some positive independent effects on
output, the order of magnitude of those effects is likely to be significantly smaller than what
has been considered so far.
It is interesting to notice, in this respect, that recent attempts to calibrate several models of the
real effects of stabilization programs have basically failed to obtain output growth in the
orders of magnitude that have been observed in actual experiences of the ERBS programs
(Reinhart and Végh, 1994; Rebelo and Végh, 1995). The results in the present paper might
help to explain those failures in a simple way: the models cannot reproduce such booms
simply because they were not caused by the stabilization programs. Thus, maybe the models
are basically correct when they predict at most modest production and consumption booms
associated with the stabilization policies.
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DISCt United States discount rate. Source: IFS of IMF.
E1i,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 during year t, if
country i started an ERBS program from july of year t-1
to june of year t, and 0 otherwise. (See the dating of
the programs in table A1).
E2i,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 during year t, if
country i is in the second year of an ERBS program, and
0 otherwise, (analogous for E3i,t).
E4i,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 during year t, if 
country i is in the fourth or following years of an ERBS
program, and 0 otherwise.
FFt United States federal funds rate. Source: IFS of IMF.
GBt United States government bonds, 3 years maturity.
Source: IFS of IMF.
GDPGi,t Rate of growth of real GDP in country i during year t.
Source: IFS of IMF.
IGDPGt Industrial countries’ GDP growth. Source: IFS of IMF.
IINVt Industrial countries’ investment to GDP ratio. Source:
IFS of IMF.
LIRi,t Logarithm of the ratio of nominal reserves to nominal
GDP for country i at the end of year t. Source: IFS of
IMF.
LPIi,t Logarithm of inflation in country i during year t.
Source: IFS of IMF.
MEi,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 during year t, if
country i is in the first year of a money based
stabilization program, and 0 otherwise.14
MLi,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 during year t, if
country i is in the last year of a money based
stabilization program, and 0 otherwise.
PARELEi,t Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the country i had a
parliamentary election during year t, and 0 otherwise.
Source: International Foundation for Election Systems,
Washington DC.
PRt Prime rate. Source: IFS of IMF.
SP500t First difference of the logarithm of the Standard and
Poors 500 stock index. Source: Global Financial Data,
Stock Market Indexes.
TBt Treasury Bill rate. Source: IFS of IMF.
TOTi,t Percent change in the terms of trade for country i
during year t. Source: ECLAC.
Major price stabilization programs in Latin America
The set of programs used in all estimations was taken from Reinhart and Végh (1994), save
for the Brazilian “Plan Real” that started in 1994. The Mexican 1987 program was considered
successful by the time this list was conformed, and its terminal date was arbitrarily set to five
years. In light of posterior events, it could be more appropriate to set the final date of this
program in December 1994. In any case, the qualitative results in this paper do not depend on
this choice. Hence, in order to make the point in this paper neat, the original Reinhart and
Végh list of programs and dating was used in the regressions reported here. Other estimations
are available upon request.15
Table A1
Major price stabilization programs in Latin America
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Source: Reinhart and Végh (1994), save for Brazil 1994 that was added later.16
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